ECON 451: Public Choice
Professor Peter Coughlin


Arrow's Most Important Contribution to Public Choice


The background reading is:

A. Feldman and R. Serrano, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd edition

[1] From "The most important..." in the 7th line of the 1st paragraph of the section " The Concerns of Social Choice" (on p. 4) through "...better than B?" at the end of the 3rd-from-last paragraph on p. 5

[2] From the beginning of Chapter 1 on p. 11 through "... individuals' preferences." at the end of the last full paragraph on p. 12

[3] From the beginning of the section "The Formal Model of Preferences" (on p. 14) through "... is acyclic." at the end of Proposition 1 on p. 15

[4] From the beginning of the section "Introduction to Social Preferences" (on p. 24) through "... individual preferences." in the 2nd sentence in the last full paragraph on p. 25

[5] From "Does a foolproof..." in the first line of the last paragraph on p. 275 through "... not yRx" in the eighth-to-last line on p. 276

[6] From "I is..." at the beginning of the sixth-to-last line on p. 276 through "... unanimous agreement" at the end of the first paragraph in the section "2. Universality" on p. 278

[7] From the beginning of the section "3. Pareto consistency" on p. 278 through "... lust and gambling." at the end of p. 278

[8] From the beginning of the section "4. Non-dictatorship" on p. 279 through the statement of Arrow's theorem on p. 282

[9] From "What then..." at the beginning of the 2nd-to-last paragraph on p. 5 through "...W, U, and V" in the 3rd line of the last paragraph on p. 5

[10] From "But it ..." at the beginning of the first full paragraph on p. 6 through the bottom of p. 6




The following items are recommended readings (which supplement the background reading):


Sherif El-Helaly, The Mathematics of Voting and Apportionment, Springer, 2019.

[1] From the beginning of Subsection 1.3.1 on page 21 through the second line on page 23;

[2] From the beginning of Subsection 1.4.1 on page 41 through Total scores near the top of page 42;

[3] From the beginning of Section 1.5 on page 52 through Theorem 1.5.12 on page 61;

[4] Subsection 1.5.6 (on pages 67 through 74).


Jonathan K. Hodge & Richard E. Klima, The Mathematics of Voting and Elections, 2nd edition, American Mathematical Society, 2018.

[1] Definition 4.3 on p. 55
[2] From the beginning of the section "Arrow's Theorem" on p. 58 through "… imposed or dictatorial." at the end of the second-to-last paragraph in the section (on p. 63)


Jean Hendriks and Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate Public Economics, 2nd edition, The MIT Press, 2013.

[1] From "The general problem …" in the first line on p. 348 through “… imperfect decision rules.” in the second line on p. 442
[2] Starting at the beginning of Section 13.8 on p. 441 and stopping at the beginning of the last paragraph in the section


Alan Taylor & Allison Pacelli, Mathematics and Politics, 2nd edition, Springer-Verlag, 2008.

From the beginning of Section 7.4 on p. 211 through the restatement of Arrow's Theorem on p. 215



These items are available through Course Reserves at ELMS.